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Improving regulatory capacity to manage risks
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Abstract
Modern trade negotiations have delivered a plethora of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs),
which involve considerable risk to public health, thus placing demands on governments to strengthen administrative
regulatory capacities in regard to the negotiation, implementation and on-going management of PTAs. In terms of risk
management, the administrative regulatory capacity requisite for appropriate negotiation of PTAs is different to
that for the implementation or on-going management of PTAs, but at all stages the capacity needed is expensive,
skill-intensive and requires considerable infrastructure, which smaller and poorer states especially struggle to find.
It is also a task generally underestimated. If states do not find ways to increase their capacities then PTAs are likely
to become much greater drivers of health inequities. Developing countries especially struggle to find this capacity.
In this article we set out the importance of administrative regulatory capacity and coordination to manage the risks
to public health associated with PTAs, and suggest ways countries can improve their capacity.
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Main text
Trade agreements can lead to substantial benefits, in-
cluding economic growth, lower cost and wider access
to goods through trade barrier reductions, and reduced
risk of military conflict between countries where their
economies are more entwined [1]. However, trade liber-
alisation concerns the public health community, for ex-
ample through the increasing spread of goods, people
and services, and the contribution to social inequalities
[2,3]. For example, risk commodity industries such as
those for tobacco, alcohol and processed food are, via
the commodities they produce, advertise and distribute,
a key global driver of the growing burden of non-
communicable disease (NCD), including diabetes, car-
diovascular disease and cancer [2,4,5].
But the scope of international trade is fast changing.
Whilst formerly preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
were generally negotiated through the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade
Organization (WTO), there has been over the last two
decades a proliferation of bilateral and regional PTAs
with increasingly ‘deep’ commitments that go beyond
those required by the WTO system. These commitments
are sometimes called ‘WTO-plus’ (consistent with but
that go beyond WTO agreements) and ‘WTO-X’ (out-
side the WTO framework) [6], and are often focused on
reducing ‘behind the border’ operations, measures im-
posed internally in the domestic market to address, for
example, health and environmental standards [7,8]. Thus
modern PTAs, often better described as investment
treaties, impact widely on areas of state regulation, in-
cluding intellectual property (IP), investment, services,
government procurement, technical standards and sanitary
and phytosanitary standards. Of particular concern is the
inclusion of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanism, allowing foreign companies to sue host
governments for compensation when policy changes
threaten their ability to generate earnings from invest-
ments, limiting signatory countries’ ‘policy space’ [9]. Such
a mechanism is proposed in two key PTAs currently
under negotiation, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
PTA involving twelve Asia-Pacific countries, Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam
[10], and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
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Partnership (TTIP), between the European Union and the
United States [9].
Expanded IP chapter provisions are also concerning,
particularly with the potential for ‘evergreening’ of
pharmaceutical patents, or the extension of patents on
medicines for slight changes to formulation without the
provision of superior benefit [11,12]. Other changes ad-
vocated in PTAs, for example proposals for an annex to
the transparency chapter of the TPP endanger pharma-
ceutical coverage programmes through risks to effective
pricing strategies such as therapeutic reference pricing,
providing new avenues for industry to appeal decisions and
requiring additional disclosure of information and avenues
for consultation and input by the industry. Others have de-
scribed more comprehensively these risks to pharmaceut-
ical coverage and reimbursement programmes [13,14].
As articulated by WHO Director-General Margaret
Chan [15] and others, such provisions in modern PTAs
shift the balance of policy-making in favour of corporate
interests, limiting policy options available to govern-
ments to protect public health [7,10], and lead to ‘policy
chill’, with governments reluctant to legislate for public
services for fear of lawsuits from foreign investors [9,16].
Examples of the public health implications of these new
PTA provisions are already emerging. For example, the
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly is suing the Canadian
government for CAD$500 million, under an ISDS mech-
anism in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), for revocation of patents on two drugs which
failed to show substantial benefit, even though the revoca-
tion of those patents was upheld in the courts [17,18].
Also using an ISDS mechanism, the tobacco company
Philip Morris is, via a bilateral investment treaty with
Hong Kong, demanding compensation from the Austra-
lian Government for the introduction of plain-packaged
cigarettes [19]. There is emerging evidence of the impact
the TPP may have on signatory countries, threatening af-
fordability and access to medicines in New Zealand [13]
and Vietnam [20], for example.
However whilst the concerns are well documented and
examples of the implications emerging, there is a vacuum
of literature on how decision-makers should respond to
such threats. Creating stronger and more legally defensible
general health exceptions within PTAs is an important
public health target, and should be of highest priority. It is
also a formidable challenge, not least due to inequalities in
bargaining power between countries with the least and
most to gain from these ‘intrusive’ PTA provisions, and
the powerful industries backing some governments. Coun-
tries should give careful consideration as to whether it is
in their interest to sign up to these PTAs at all. But such
decision-making is often part of the negotiation process,
in which to participate effectively requires a country have
considerable administrative regulatory capacity, especially
given the costs and benefits to becoming party to a PTA
are often very difficult to assess.
Given the challenges of negotiating PTAs, and for
those countries that do become signatories to PTAs, the
on-going need for further PTA ‘risk management’, we
have sought to identify the administrative regulatory
capacities a country needs to develop to protect its na-
tional public health interests. We use the term administra-
tive regulatory capacity to refer to a range of capacities.
Administrative capacities include the capacity to imple-
ment procedures (for example, procedures of public con-
sultation, coordination amongst government departments)
and rules (for example, the rules required to register
patents or implement food safety standards). Regulatory
capacity relates to the technical competence required to
interpret, monitor, adjust and, if necessary, set new regula-
tory standards. As we will see, a state needs deep reser-
voirs of these kinds of capacities if it is to protect its public
health interests in the negotiation, implementation and
management of a PTA. The capacity issues we identify
pose the greatest problems for least-developed and de-
veloping countries, but are not confined to them. Even
middle-sized developed countries experience dimensions
of the capacity problems that we identify.
First, we address the importance of public sector
administrative regulatory capacity and coordination for
managing the risks to public health from PTAs within
an evolving global trade system, and second, we suggest
ways that countries can improve this capacity.
Negotiation of PTAs
The negotiation of PTAs requires significant administra-
tive regulatory capacity. But even then they should be
approached with caution, given emerging evidence of
the extreme risks of becoming party to the provisions in
modern PTAs.
At the time of negotiation, it is often difficult to know
the real costs and benefits of PTAs for public health be-
cause of the indeterminacy of the principles they establish
or because of difficulties predicting the effects of specific
rules in dynamically changing markets. An example of the
indeterminacy problem is the current WTO litigation over
Australia’s plain packaging legislation for tobacco products
(a second legal challenge to Australia’s plain packaging
legislation). During the 1970s and 1980s tobacco multi-
nationals became advocates of stronger trademark protec-
tion. Both individually and as part of business organizations
such as the International AntiCounterfeiting Organization,
companies such as Philip Morris pushed an international
trademark agenda. Briefly, stronger trademark protection
became a key issue for a number of globalized industry
sectors in the 1980s, leading a coalition of US, European
Union and Japanese multinationals to draft text for an
IP agreement [21]. In 1988 this coalition presented its
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draft to the main government players involved in nego-
tiating what became the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (1994)
[21]. Included in this draft was wording on the principle
of the ‘unjustified encumbrance of a trade mark’, a vari-
ant of which is found in one of the articles central to
TRIPS and now, some 25 years after its articulation by
multinational business interests, the subject of WTO
proceedings in which a number of countries are arguing
Australia’s plain packaging law breaches the principle.
Understanding the full costs of TRIPS would have
been difficult back in the 1980s. This is precisely the
point. Trade negotiators did not understand them and
most likely made little attempt to do so. This example
serves as a warning to today’s trade negotiators, and
highlights the danger of entering into an agreement
where business interests have a disproportionate influ-
ence on the PTA text. Where business interests do have
a disproportionate influence on the PTA text, states
could easily leave the negotiating table having delivered
private gains to industry actors while increasing costs to
the public in the form of, for example, higher prices to
medicines.
The risk management problem in regard to the negoti-
ation of PTAs is exacerbated for developing countries by
an inequality of bargaining power. PTAs involving the
US, for example, are by far the most comprehensive in
terms of their coverage of goods and services and their
inclusion of WTO-plus provisions with greater public
health risk [22]. Studies of PTAs between large devel-
oped countries and small developing countries find a
weak reciprocity; the small country gives up a lot to gain
a little [23]. Importantly, the developing country in these
cases takes on developed country regulatory standards
without having the capacity of the developed country to
manage the risks of those standards [24].
An example of this relates to food safety standards.
Through agreements such as WTO’s Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary (SPS) Agreement, developing countries have been
drawn into complying with international standards set by
bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
Some PTAs under negotiation include provisions relating
to SPS standards, that are ‘WTO-plus’ and ‘WTO-X’ [6]).
Most developing countries lack the scientific capacity
needed to evaluate the public health costs and benefits of
these food standards or to play an influential role in the
technical meetings that produce them [25-27].
Implementation and on-going management of PTAs
Not only do countries need the administrative regulatory
capacity to effectively negotiate PTAs, if they do decide
to become signatories, they also need to increase their
capacities in regard to PTA implementation and on-
going management. The earlier examples of corporations
suing the Australian and Canadian governments highlight
the need for administrative capacity to defend public inter-
ests against globally coordinated litigation strategies backed
by multinationals, law firms and lobbyists [11,28,29].
On-going management of PTAs poses a huge adminis-
trative burden to governments. For example, PTAs often
create a linkage between a drug registration authority’s
work and the patent system by requiring the drug au-
thority to establish procedures that allow a patent owner
to prevent the marketing of a drug by a third party that
it believes affects its patent rights [30]. This requires in-
dependent scrutiny of a patent owner’s strategic use of
patents. The United States has the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice to police anticompetitive uses of IP by pharma-
ceutical companies, with budgets and full-time equiva-
lent staff (2013) of US $312 million and 1176, and US
$165 million and 851, respectively [31-33] – a scale out
of most countries’ reach.
Kesselheim et al. [29] have described the pharmaceutical
industry’s systematic engagement in activities (legal and
illegal) to promote drug sales and their resistance to exter-
nal regulatory approaches. The US Attorney General has
noted the difficulty of enforcing limits on pharmaceutical
industry behaviour in managing the risks of monopoly
extension, despite the considerable resources available
to the US government [11].
States need to find ways to increase administrative
regulatory capacity
If states do not find ways to increase their administrative
regulatory capacities in regard to the negotiation, imple-
mentation and on-going management of PTAs, these PTAs
will potentially drive greater health inequities [10,34]. But
how might countries, and particularly small and poor
countries, improve their capacity to manage the risks of
PTAs? The scale of the problem is daunting, however
we offer the following suggestions.
First, states have to recognize that PTAs carry social
risks and costs, and that administrative regulatory cap-
acity is needed for their risk management, including
their negotiation, and later, assuming a country does
choose to become a signatory, implementation and on-
going management.
Second, states should not confuse this risk manage-
ment task with compliance and acquiescing to donor aid
objectives. The EU, for example, has been active in
Southeast Asia helping countries establish patent offices.
However, the grant of patents by these offices over-
whelmingly benefits EU companies in sectors such as
pharmaceuticals. Accepting donor packages for patent
offices that do not deal with well-known problems such
as ‘evergreening’ of pharmaceutical patents, will simply
increase rather than decrease risks to public health [35].
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Whilst external assistance can be useful and non-
governmental organisations supporting developing coun-
tries often play a crucial role here, the politics of ‘aid for
trade’ is complex [36,37], and there is danger in accepting
institutional aid from regulatory missionaries with compli-
ance objectives.
Third, since resources are scarce, developing countries
should pick administrative regulatory capacity targets,
giving priority (considering limited resources) to creating
nodes of excellence – areas in which the development of
regulatory capacity is prioritised – in public health regu-
lation, rather than attempting with limited resources to
achieve such regulatory ‘excellence’ across the board of
needed regulation, which given resource constraints may
be unrealistic. It may be prudent to develop a node of
excellence first in regard to the negotiation of PTAs,
however, and this relates to point five, if such expertise
can be appropriately shared perhaps regionally, a differ-
ent regulatory target may be more appropriate.
A fourth and related point is that creating these nodes
of excellence might be easier and indeed more justifiable
by learning from the regulatory experience of other
countries and encouraging the dissemination of best
practice. Such regulatory learning from others’ examples
is difficult, being more bounded than rational and sub-
ject to biases [38]. Others’ adoption of a seemingly suc-
cessful practice can be highly motivating. But it is also
the case that developing countries such as Brazil, China
and India have begun to realize the problems of trade
agreements containing IP chapters and have started to
address these through regulation. For example, Brazil
has devised an approach in which the National Sanitary
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) is involved in the exam-
ination and grant of pharmaceutical patents rather than
having all regulatory power over the grant of pharma-
ceutical patents centred in the Brazilian patent office
[39]. This model of more disperse regulatory power
grants some influence to a public health perspective ra-
ther than simply paying it lip service. It also provides a
safeguard against regulatory capture (when a regulatory
agency tasked with acting in the public interest instead
advances the commercial or special concerns of interest
groups that dominate the industry of sector it is charged
with regulating) of a patent office. In a world where
governance and regulation increasingly takes on network
forms, Brazil’s experiment with ANVISA forms a node of
excellence with which other developing countries might
form ties. These might range from sharing experiences and
data to adopting some variant of the ANVISA model. In
regard to food trade and nutrition, inspiration and learning
may be drawn from, for example, Ghana’s innovative use
of food standards to reduce the availability of high-fat meat
(mainly imported) from the national food supply, but in
compliance with international trade law [40].
Fifth, developing countries specifically should be looking
to intensify collaboration and networking amongst them-
selves. Some authors have documented an increasing
interest in such ‘south-south cooperation’ [41]. Hoekman
et al. [42] has suggested a ‘services knowledge platform’ to
bring together regional regulators, officials and stake-
holders to discuss regulatory reform for trade and invest-
ment services. In Southeast Asia, the Association of
Southeast Nations (ASEAN) has been considered a plat-
form for such regional cooperation for trade and health
[2]. Rather than trying to achieve a ‘regulatory state’ in-
volving governmental structures, developing countries
might instead work towards a ‘regulatory society’ of net-
worked governance in which to achieve regulation, with
the state networked to non-state actors such as non-
governmental organisations, industry co-regulators, pro-
fessional and international organisations [43]. US models
of private enforcement of public regulation depend on an
entrepreneurial adversarial legal culture that is not found
in most developing countries. An African country is just
as likely to gain valuable insights from studying the South
African Competition Commission’s experience in regulat-
ing pharmaceutical companies as it is from studying the
work of the US Federal Trade Commission [20]. South-
South regulatory learning and diffusion – and indeed, co-
ordinated action – is just as important as North-South
learning in this context.
Conclusion
Entering into PTAs should be approached cautiously,
and with the capacity to negotiate effectively. However
for those states that do decide to proceed, it is important
to have the capacity to manage the risks they pose to
public health through regulation. Thus, the negotiation,
implementation and on-going management of PTAs all
require considerable administrative regulatory capacity –
a significant administrative burden on governments. States
must recognize the importance of this risk-management
task; distinguish it from regulatory compliance; and focus
on regulatory learning and building nodes of excellence in
regulation. Developing countries especially will benefit
from networking to overcome capacity deficits and look
to South-South collaborations in the process of regulatory
learning.
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